This infographic from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies is highly instructive. It suggests a correlation between declining international military assistance and rising violence linked to militant Islamist groups in Mali. Here are a few observations inspired by this excellent work, which I recommend reading: A similar infographic on Burkina Faso could be beneficial. This country, which has grown very close to Mali, is in turn questioning its partnership with Western countries. Its participation in regional security initiatives (G5 Sahel, Accra Initiative...) also seems to be declining, while the number of victims and displaced persons continues to rise. Indeed, after securing the departure of the French Sabre force, a few days ago Burkina Faso denounced a military assistance agreement signed with France in 1961. Admittedly, the footprint of foreign forces in Burkina Faso was smaller than in Mali, which had been home to UN, European and G5 Sahel forces for a decade. However, it remains interesting to examine and visualize the evolution of jihadist violence before and after the cessation of French military assistance to Burkina. In Niger, the presence of Western forces has increased since their departure from Mali. But it must be pointed out that the level of violence there was already relatively lower, even though Niger is facing two jihadist insurgencies on its borders with Burkina Faso and Mali, as well as those with Nigeria. We can also observe here that, in addition to decisive international support (in equipment and logistics, for example), other factors linked to the agentivity and quality of the definition and implementation of its security/stabilization policies can explain this country's better situation. Similarly, the continuity and stability of the civilian regime, as well as the improved cohesion and coordination of Niger's defense and security forces, are also factors to be taken into account. In this respect also, it could be useful to know whether the comparatively low level of jihadist violence can be decisively correlated with the scale of military assistance. Finally, a comparative infographic of insecurity levels in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger in relation to international military support could be instructive. This would make it possible to examine, at the level of the central Sahel, whether and to what extent external military assistance influences the evolution of the level of jihadist violence, as well as the improvement or deterioration of the security situation in the Sahel countries. West African coastal countries could draw useful lessons from this to better calibrate their international military cooperation strategies against the jihadist violence now affecting them.